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Abstract  
 
The convergence clubs literature in applied growth theory suggests that countries that 
differ in terms of structural characteristics and initial conditions tend to experience 
diverging growth performances. What is the role of technological knowledge for the 
formation of clubs? The paper investigates this unexplored question by carrying out 
an empirical study of the cross-country distribution of knowledge in a large sample of 
developed and developing economies in the 1990s. The results indicate the existence 
of three technology clubs characterized by markedly different levels of development. 
The clubs also differ with respect to the dynamics of their capabilities over the 
decade, as the most advanced group and the intermediate one are found to be much 
more dynamic than the large cluster of less developed economies. 
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1. Introduction  
Nowadays it is well accepted that the distribution of knowledge across nations 
is unbalanced. Countries in the world economy are characterized by different levels of 
technological development and have unequal access to knowledge stocks, and this is a 
major factor to explain their different competitive patterns and diverging economic 
dynamics in the long run (for an historical overview, see von Tunzelmann, 1995).  
The investigation of the reasons behind cross-country differences in the 
creation and exploitation of knowledge constitutes, in a nutshell, the main interest of 
the national innovation systems literature (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 
1997). Studies in this tradition have become increasingly popular in the last couple of 
decades, and have greatly enriched our understanding of the functioning and evolution 
of the competencies of nations. Besides the great variety of theoretical insights that 
the systemic perspective has made it possible to achieve, several empirically oriented 
studies have also tried to operationalize the approach by measuring different aspects 
of the process of knowledge creation and dissemination in a large sample of countries, 
and by investigating the extent of cross-country differences (Archibugi and Coco, 
2004a; 2004b; Grupp and Mogee, 2004).  
To what extent have these new insights been recognised, not to say accepted, 
by applied growth theory in mainstream economics? Not much, arguably. Applied 
growth theory has achieved considerable progress in the last decade, and, moving 
away from the traditional cross-country regression framework, it has made use of a 
wide array of econometric techniques to point to the existence of a great deal of 
heterogeneity across countries.1 However, the study of macroeconomic variety has 
mainly been analysed in terms of economic factors, while the role of cross-country 
differences in the ability to create and imitate advanced knowledge has not been 
investigated to the same extent. 
This is particularly evident when we look at the recent flourishing of empirical 
studies in the convergence clubs tradition (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995). The general 
idea of this literature, that countries that differ in terms of structural characteristics 
and initial conditions tend to experience diverging growth performances, has 
increasingly attracted the attention of applied growth scholars, who have recently 
proposed a range of different economic explanations for the existence of convergence 
                                                 
1 See overviews by Temple (1999), Islam (2003) and Castellacci (2007). 
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clubs in the world economy (Desdoigts, 1999; Hobjin and Franses, 2000; Johnson and 
Takeyama, 2001; Papageorgiou, 2002; Fiaschi and Lavezzi, 2003; Canova, 2004). 
None of these previous works, however, has investigated the uneven distribution of 
knowledge across nations and the importance of this for the formation of clubs.  
For innovation scholars, the idea that cross-country differences in knowledge 
stocks and technological capabilities may be one major factor to explain the existence 
of different country clubs is a natural hypothesis to investigate (see Godinho et al., 
2005). What is the role of technological knowledge for the formation of clubs? The 
paper investigates this unexplored question by carrying out an empirical study of 
cross-country differences in the ability to exploit the process of knowledge creation 
and dissemination, focusing on a large sample of developed and developing 
economies in the 1990s. 
The purpose of the paper is thus to study the existence, characteristics and 
dynamics of different technology clubs in the world economy. The study, empirical in 
nature, will explore the existence of groups of countries characterized by different 
levels of knowledge stocks and technological infrastructures, point out their 
characteristics and the distance that separates them, and analyse their different 
dynamics over time. 
The analysis makes use of the ArCo database (Archibugi and Coco, 2004a; 
2004b) that contains a set of indicators on various aspects of countries’ technological 
activities for a large number of developed and developing economies. The dataset 
makes it possible to consider various aspects of countries’ technological capabilities, 
such as their ability to create and to imitate advanced knowledge, their technological 
infrastructures and their education levels.  
The empirical work analyses these data by using a three-step methodology. 
First, the large number of available indicators is reduced to a smaller number of 
dimensions by means of a factor analysis. Secondly, these main dimensions are used 
to identify different country groups through clustering techniques. Finally, a 
multinomial logit test is estimated in order to assess the statistical precision of the 
resulting club classification.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
indicators used to measure countries’ knowledge stocks and technological 
capabilities, and then reports the results of the factor analysis. Section 3 presents the 
results of a hierarchical cluster analysis, which explores the existence of various 
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groups of countries differing in terms of their levels of technological development. 
The results of the cluster analysis show the existence of three clubs characterized by 
strikingly different levels and diverging dynamics of technological knowledge. 
Section 4 reports the results of the multinomial logit test of our technology club 
classification, which provides basic support for its validity and classificatory power. 
Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing the theoretical interpretation of the 
empirical results and the related policy implications. 
 
 
2. Data, indicators and discriminatory factors  
The process of knowledge creation and dissemination is a complex and 
multifaceted aspect of economic progress. Countries’ technological capabilities are 
strictly related to a number of different aspects, such as the basic and advanced human 
capital base, the infrastructures that support industrial production and innovative 
activities, and the nation’s ability to create, imitate and manage a complex pool of 
advanced technological knowledge.  
The complexity of the concept of technological change presents a formidable 
challenge to its measurement in empirical analyses. In the economics literature on 
technology and convergence, the standard approach to measure technological change 
is to rely on an indirect measure, the so-called ‘productivity residual’ or ‘total factor 
productivity’ (TFP; see Prescott, 1998; Islam, 1999). In an attempt to provide a richer 
characterization and a more precise measurement of countries’ ability to create and 
imitate advanced knowledge, this paper follows a different strategy, and makes use of 
a set of indicators that measure directly various relevant aspects of their technological 
capabilities. 
The empirical analysis is based on the ArCo database, a dataset recently 
constructed by Archibugi and Coco (2004a; 2004b) that includes a set of indicators of 
knowledge creation and dissemination for a large number of developed and 
developing economies. The sample used in this paper consists of 131 countries (listed 
in Appendix 1), whose technological capabilities are measured at two different points 
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in time, at the beginning and at the end of the 1990s. The indicators are briefly 
described as follows.2
Patents: Number of patents registered at the US Patent and Trademark Office 
per million people (USPTO, 2002). Patents represent a form of codified knowledge 
generated by profit-seeking firms and organisations.3 This indicator is hence a 
measure of the technological innovations generated for commercial purposes. 
 Scientific articles: Number of scientific articles per million people (NSF, 
2000, 2002).4 Scientific literature is another important source of codified knowledge. 
It represents the knowledge generated in the public sector, and most notably in 
universities and other public research institutes, although researchers working in the 
business sector publish a significant and growing share of scientific articles. 
Internet penetration: Number of Internet users per 1,000 people (ITU, 2001; 
World Bank, 2003).5 The indicator accounts for this new form of technological 
infrastructure, which facilitates the transfer of codified knowledge. The Internet is a 
new technology that has quickly become the keystone of the Information and 
Communication Technology, but it was not yet commercially available in 1990. For 
this reason, we have postponed the beginning of the period to 1994. 
Telephone penetration: Sum of telephone mainlines and mobile phones per 
1,000 people (ITU, 2001; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2003).6 Telephony, both in 
fixed and mobile forms, constitutes a fundamental infrastructure for business 
                                                 
2 For a more complete description of the dataset and the methodology used to construct it, see 
Archibugi and Coco (2004a), while the main differences between the ArCo technology index and other 
similar analyses to measure countries’ technological capabilities are described in Archibugi and Coco 
(2004b).  
3 To account for yearly fluctuations (which might affect the results in small and medium-sized 
countries), we have considered a four-year moving average for the 1987-1990 and 1997-2000 periods. 
Patents are a good proxy of commercially exploitable and proprietary technological inventions, but we 
are well aware that many inventions are not patented, especially among those invented in developing 
countries. For surveys on patents as internationally comparable indicators, see Pavitt (1988) and 
Archibugi (1992). 
4 The source of these data is the Science Citation Index generated by the Institute for Scientific 
Information, which is the most comprehensive and validated available source on scientific publication. 
It reports information on the scientific and technical articles published in a sample of about 8,000 
journals selected among the most prestigious in the world. The fields covered are: physics, biology, 
chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth 
and space sciences. Article counts are based on fractional assignments; for example, an article with two 
authors from different countries is counted as one-half article to each country.  
5 Internet users access a worldwide network. They differ from Internet hosts, which are computers with 
active Internet Protocol (IP) addresses connected to the Internet. The data on users, when available, are 
preferable to those on hosts for two reasons: first, they give a more precise idea of the diffusion of 
Internet among the population; second, some hosts do not have a country code identification and in 
statistics are assumed to be located in the United States, thus causing a bias towards that country.  
6 We have chosen to assign equal weights to fixed and mobile phones because, although they 
incorporate different degrees of technology, they share the same function. 
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purposes, and it allows tracing populations with human skills and acquiring technical 
information. 
Electricity consumption: Number of kilowatts of electricity consumed per 
hour per capita. This measures the production of power plants and combined heat and 
power plants, less distribution losses, and own use by heat and power plants (see 
World Bank, 2003, table 5.10). This indicator accounts for the oldest technological 
infrastructure. Electricity consumption is also a proxy measure for the use of 
machinery and equipment since most of it is generated by electric power.7  
Tertiary science and engineering enrolment: Share of tertiary students in 
science and engineering in the population of that age group (UNESCO, 2002; World 
Bank, 2003). This variable is a measure of the formation of advanced human capital 
in science and technology, which represents a necessary requirement for acquiring 
and managing advanced technological knowledge. 
Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of school completed in 
the population over 14 (Barro and Lee, 2001; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2003). 
Although this indicator does not consider differences in the quality of schooling 
across countries, it constitutes a widely used proxy of the level of basic human skill.  
Literacy rate: The percentage of people over 14 who can, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (UNDP, 
2001; World Bank, 2003). The literacy rate is a necessary precondition for the 
development of human skills and of basic and advanced human capital.  
These eight indicators are those that we will use to analyse the distribution of 
knowledge across nations and to measure the extent of cross-country differences in 
the 1990s. The reason for selecting this set of indicators is twofold. First, from a 
conceptual point of view, we follow previous studies (Archibugi and Coco, 2004a, 
2004b; UNDP, 2001) and argue that these variables represent distinct aspects of the 
process of national technological accumulation and capacity building, namely the 
innovative capability of a nation (i.e. patents and scientific articles), its endowment in 
terms of (new and old types of) technological infrastructures (e.g. Internet, telephony 
and electricity), and its advanced and basic education levels (i.e. tertiary enrolment, 
schooling and the literacy rate). Secondly, these indicators are available for a very 
large number of developed and developing economies in the 1990s. Other indicators 
                                                 
7 Other valuable measures of industrial capacity developed, for example, by Lall and his colleagues 
(see Lall and Albaladejo, 2001; UNIDO, 2002) are available for a smaller number of countries only. 
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could have been chosen instead to measure more specific aspects of national 
knowledge capabilities, but their country coverage would have been much more 
limited, due to missing data for several less developed economies.  
The advantage of using a relatively large number of indicators is that we are 
able to provide a more precise characterization of countries’ positions in the process 
of knowledge creation and dissemination than if we were using one single indirect 
measure such as the TFP. This is particularly important in a large sample that includes 
countries characterized by very different levels of technological and economic 
development. It is however necessary to point out two important aspects, and possible 
limitations, of this set of indicators. 
The first is that these variables do not include any measure of international 
integration. It could be argued that two countries with identical performance in the 
eight dimensions highlighted above will have different capabilities if their level of 
international integration is substantially different. One of the key characteristics of 
technology is precisely its global dimension (Archibugi and Michie, 1995; for a 
survey, see Carlsson, 2006), and a country well connected and well integrated in the 
world economy will be able to access and exploit more knowledge and to make better 
use of it. In the original ArCo database, three indicators of technological integration 
were, in fact, also considered: inward foreign direct investment, technology licensing 
payments and import of capital goods (see Archibugi and Coco, 2004a, table 7). 
Because of data restrictions, though, it was possible to consider these indicators for a 
more limited number of countries only, and data for several developing countries 
were missing. The similarity between the two country rankings was, however, quite 
evident (linear correlation coefficient between the ArCo index and the ArCo-plus-
import-technology index equal to 0.99). This indicates that the advantage of being 
well integrated into the global economy is also reflected in the values of the eight 
indicators presented above. In short, by focusing on these eight dimensions, we may 
lose in theory the effect of global integration of knowledge; the real effect is however 
rather small and, by restricting our focus to these variables, we are able to consider a 
much larger set of economies, including also many developing countries. 
A second major difficulty in using these indicators is that they represent to a 
great extent strictly related (and not easily separable) aspects of countries’ 
technological capabilities. Variables measuring the creation and diffusion of new 
knowledge, technological infrastructures and human skills tend in fact to be highly 
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correlated, as they all constitute complementary dimensions of national technological 
capabilities.8 Thus, before proceeding to the core of our empirical analysis, the study 
of cross-country differences in technology, it is important to reduce this large set of 
indicators to a smaller number of distinct (not overlapping) dimensions.  
A factor analysis has been performed in order to identify the explanatory 
variables that are better suited to analyse the cross-country distribution of knowledge, 
i.e. those variables that better discriminate between countries’ technological levels.9 
The purpose of the factor analysis is to extract a smaller number of factors that are 
able to account for most of the variance in the sample.10
Tables 1a and 1b present the results of the factor analysis for our ArCo dataset 
for the years 1990 and 2000 respectively. Three different methods of factor extraction 
have been used: (i) principal components; (ii) generalized least squares; and (iii) 
maximum likelihood.11 All three methods identify two major factors, which appear to 
be stable over time between 1990 (table 1a) and 2000 (table 1b). These two factors 
taken together explain a large percentage of the variance in the sample (between 72% 
and 82%), and the goodness of fit of the two-factor solution is confirmed by the χ2 test 
(reported in the last row of the tables for the GLS and ML methods). This is 
significant at conventional levels, thus showing that these two factors account for 
most of the variability in the data.12 Our interpretation of the factor solutions is the 
following. 
                                                 
8 Relatedly, some of these indicators are also positively correlated with GDP per capita, given that 
technological infrastructures, human skills and innovative capabilities are closely linked to the overall 
level of economic development of a country. This is a more general limitation of the set of indicators 
that we use in this paper. This limitation is, however, not easy to overcome, given that most indicators 
of technological capabilities that are available for a large sample of countries do also reflect other 
aspects of the development process like consumption and investment patterns, as for instance is the 
case for our indicators of telephony, electricity consumption and education levels. 
9 Interestingly, in a comprehensive survey of growth theory, Temple (1999, p. 148) argues: “Despite 
some interest from development economists, simple techniques for data reduction like factor analysis 
and principal components have been largely ignored by recent growth researchers. Their use seems to 
have a great deal of potential.” For previous papers applying factor analysis to the study of economic 
growth and development, see Adelman and Morris (1965) and Temple and Johnson (1998). 
10 The eight indicators of countries’ technological capabilities have been standardized before entering 
the factor analysis. The general formula used to standardize the indicators adopts the “distance from the 
best and the worst performers” method of standardization, which is the same used for the indicators 
composing the Technology Achievement Index (UNDP, 2001; Desai et al., 2002) and the ArCo 
Technology Index (Archibugi and Coco, 2004a, 2004b). Different methods of standardization could 
have been used, but the choice of a different standardization method would have not affected the results 
of the factor analysis. 
11 The use of these three different methods of factor extraction enables to assess the robustness of the 
results, as different algorithms may sometimes lead to extracting different factors. 
12 The same tests for the three-, four-, and five-factor solutions yield no significant results. This 
suggests that the extraction of additional factors after the second contributes only marginally to the 
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Factor 1 may be interpreted as a broad measure of technological 
infrastructures and human skills. This principal component in fact loads very high on 
all the variables measuring technological infrastructures (telephone penetration and 
electricity consumption) and those measuring education levels and human skills 
(tertiary science and engineering enrolment, mean years of schooling, and literacy 
rate). The extraction of this first factor shows that infrastructures and human skills are 
highly correlated and strongly complementary to each other. Both of them contribute 
to define each country’s absorptive capacity, i.e. its ability to imitate and to 
implement foreign advanced technologies, which is a key requirement for developing 
economies that try to reduce the huge gap that separates them from the technological 
frontier (Abramovitz, 1986). Factor 1, a linear combination of these five variables, 
accounts for around 40-45% of the variance in the sample in both periods, and it 
therefore appears as a very relevant dimension to investigate cross-country differences 
in technological capabilities in the 1990s.  
Factor 2 may be interpreted as a measure of the creation and diffusion of 
codified knowledge. It is highly correlated with variables measuring the creation of 
codified technological knowledge by private firms and the public sector (i.e. patents 
per capita and the production of scientific articles), and its diffusion (measured by the 
Internet penetration). The factor indicates that the creation and diffusion of advanced 
technologies are to a large extent related and complementary aspects of countries’ 
technological activities. Both contribute to determine the innovative capability of 
nations, which is a fundamental requirement to compete in the modern knowledge-
based economy, particularly for countries that are already close to the technological 
frontier. Factor 2 is a linear combination of these three variables, and it accounts for 
about 30-37% of the variance in the sample. Thus, together with factor 1, it appears to 
be a very important aspect to study differences in technological capabilities in the 
world economy. 
Figure 1 reports the kernel density estimates of the statistical distributions of 
these two principal components in 1990 and 2000. The graphs show clearly that the 
shapes of the distributions of the two factors are very different. The thick and long left 
tail of factor 1 suggests the existence of a great cross-country variability of 
                                                                                                                                            
overall percentage of variance explained, and the two-factor solutions may be regarded as the most 
efficient, in the sense of explaining a large portion of the variability in the sample by using only a small 
number of factors. This conclusion is confirmed by graphical inspection of the Scree plot, which also 
supports the choice of the first two factors as the most relevant for our subsequent analysis. 
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technological infrastructures and human skills within the large group of less 
developed economies. By contrast, factor 2 shows a long right tail, which indicates 
that innovative capabilities are very low for most developing countries in the sample, 
while they vary significantly within the group of middle income and advanced 
countries. Given that the purpose of this paper is to analyse differences in 
technological capabilities in a very large sample of 131 countries, including both 
developing and developed economies, both factors identified by the principal 
component analysis will be used in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
< Table 1a, table 1b and figure 1 here > 
 
 
3. The technology clubs and their dynamics over the 1990s 
We will now use these two principal components to investigate the existence 
and the characteristics of different technology clubs in the world economy in the 
1990s. This section presents the results of a cluster analysis that divides the world 
economy into a few country groups characterized by different levels of knowledge 
stocks and technological development.  
Two different specifications of the cluster analysis have been tested. In the 
first, the two principal components extracted by the factor analysis in the previous 
section have been used as inputs in the clustering algorithm. In the second, two 
variables have been used instead: the literacy rate (corresponding to factor 1) and the 
number of scientific articles per capita (corresponding to factor 2). These two 
variables have been selected because (i) they are more strongly correlated with each 
component of the factor analysis (see tables 1a and 1b), and (ii) their distribution 
shapes are more similar to those of the two components. In other words, this means 
that these two indicators are those that best represent (and most closely correspond to) 
the factors extracted in the factor analysis.13 In fact, the literacy rate variable varies 
substantially within the large group of developing economies (as the first principal 
component), while the scientific articles indicator has a great deal of cross-country 
variation when we consider middle-income and more advanced countries (as the 
                                                 
13 Both variables have been standardized before entering the clustering algorithms, as is customary in 
cluster analysis. 
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second component). Both aspects are therefore relevant in our large cross-country 
sample. 
As is well known, the results of cluster analysis may change substantially 
when different methods are applied to the same dataset. In order to overcome this 
problem, we have run around thirty different clustering algorithms. For each of the 
two specifications, we have proceeded in three steps. First, three distinct hierarchical 
agglomerative methods have been applied (between groups linkage, within groups 
linkage, Ward’s method), and three different ways to measure the distance between 
cases have been used (Euclidean, squared Euclidean, and cosine distance). Secondly, 
after having identified the main resulting clusters, an iterative partitioning method (K-
means procedure) has been applied to check the robustness of the results of the 
hierarchical agglomerative analysis. Additionally, each clustering algorithm has been 
run by using as inputs the factors (and the corresponding variables) in both 1990 and 
in 2000, so as to assess the stability of the resulting clusters over time. 
The methodology that we have employed has three advantages: (i) it makes it 
possible to check the robustness of the results to changes in the variables used as 
inputs, in the clustering method and in the distance measurement adopted; (ii) it 
allows investigating whether the resulting clusters are stable over time between 1990 
and 2000, in terms of both cluster characteristics and cluster membership; (iii) the 
hierarchical agglomerative method employed is able to identify endogenously the 
number of clusters that forms the best partition of the dataset. 
All of the clustering algorithms have produced three main clusters, and this 
result appears to be robust to modifications in the method applied, in the definition of 
distance measurement adopted, and in the variables used as inputs in the analysis. The 
existence of three different groups of countries is also apparent from a graphical 
inspection of the kernel density estimates of the two principal components, which 
indicate that both of them, and particularly factor 1, are characterized by a three peaks 
distribution (see Figure 1, section 2).  
The three resulting clusters are to a large extent the same in 1990 and 2000, 
with only a few changes of cluster memberships between the two periods. The major 
characteristics of these three clubs are presented in table 2, and the cluster 
membership is indicated in Appendix 1. Table 3 reports, in addition, the technology 
gap between the clubs and its rate of change over the 1990s. The three groups are 
briefly described as follows. 
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 Cluster 1: Advanced (high infrastructures and skills, high innovation) 
This is the group of more technologically advanced countries, composed of a 
small set of industrialized economies (between 15 and 21 countries, less than 15% of 
the sample’s population) that hold approximately 40% of the world GDP. It comprises 
the traditional leaders, US and Japan, Continental and Northern European economies, 
and Western offshoots (Australia, Canada, Israel and New Zealand). The cluster 
membership is quite stable over time, the main difference being the entry of a few 
very dynamic Asian NICs (Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore) into this 
restricted club in 2000.  
Table 2 shows that at the beginning of the period the group was characterized 
by high levels of creation and diffusion of codified knowledge (on average, around 69 
patents, 627 scientific articles and 27 Internet users per capita), well-developed 
technological infrastructures (in terms of both telephones and electricity 
consumption), and high levels of basic and advanced education (nearly 11% tertiary 
enrolment ratio in science and engineering, 10 mean years of schooling, and 99% 
literacy rate).  
The cluster does also prove to be very dynamic over time, with rapid growth 
rates of technological capabilities between 1990 and 2000, particularly in terms of 
patents (+40%), Internet users (+986%), telephones (+104%) and tertiary enrolment 
ratios in science and engineering (nearly +60%). The technological frontier has thus 
advanced rapidly in the last decade. 
 
Cluster 2: Followers (medium-high infrastructures and skills, low innovation) 
This is a larger group, composed of around 70 countries (around 27% of the 
sample’s population in 1990) that accounted for 36% of the world GDP at the 
beginning of the period. The cluster membership is quite stable between 1990 and 
2000, and its core is constituted by catching-up economies from South-East Asia, 
Southern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, plus the large group of Former 
Socialist countries.  
There are only a few notable changes to this cluster composition over time. In 
2000, the main exit consists of a small set of dynamic Asian and Continental 
European economies that abandon the group and move towards the advanced club, 
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while the entry is that of a small number of fast catching-up developing countries, 
from Asia, the Middle East, Central America and Africa, which rapidly improved 
their technological capabilities in the 1990s. 
Admittedly, this second club represents a rather heterogeneous group of 
economies. Compared to the advanced cluster, the group shows on average a much 
lower ability to create and to imitate advanced knowledge, as measured by the number 
of patents, scientific articles and Internet users. In fact, table 3 indicates that at the 
beginning of the 1990s the innovation gap between the advanced and the followers 
group is huge (around 16:1 for patents, 9:1 for articles and 11:1 for Internet users). 
Over the decade, the knowledge distance has gradually decreased in terms of patents 
and articles, and much more rapidly in terms of Internet users. However, the 
innovation gap vis-à-vis the economies in the advanced cluster does remain 
considerable at the end of the decade. On the other hand, the technological distance 
between this second group and the more advanced one is significantly lower in terms 
of infrastructures (around 3:1 for telephones and electricity), and education levels 
(between 1.5:1 and 2:1), in both 1990 and 2000.  
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized (low infrastructures and skills, low innovation) 
This is the largest group of countries, accounting for more than 60% of the 
sample’s population in 1990, but producing only around 23% of the world GDP at the 
beginning of the decade. The core of this cluster consists of large Asian economies 
plus nearly all the African countries. The group membership is rather stable in the 
1990s, although a restricted number of dynamic economies have managed to catch up 
and to join the more advanced followers cluster in 2000 (e.g. China, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Iran, Oman, and a very few countries from Central America and Africa).  
In terms of the ability to create advanced knowledge and to imitate new 
technologies, this group is not only remarkably far from the advanced club, but also 
quite distant from the follower countries in the second cluster. Table 3 shows in fact 
that at the beginning of the period the distance between the followers and the 
marginalized groups is around 190:1 in terms of patents, 14:1 for scientific articles, 
and 270:1 for Internet users. During the decade, the gap diminished very rapidly in 
terms of Internet users, but it significantly widened for patents and articles.  
Regarding the indicators of technological infrastructures and human skills, the 
distance vis-à-vis the followers cluster at the beginning of the period is equally 
 12
striking, particularly in terms of telephones (12.2:1), electricity consumption (9.7:1) 
and tertiary enrolment ratio in science and engineering (5.2:1). Over the 1990s, the 
gap in terms of technological infrastructures and human skills decreased slowly, but it 
still remained huge at the end of the decade.  
 
< Tables 2 and 3 here > 
 
In short, the results of the cluster analysis lead to the identification of three 
technology clubs with markedly different levels of technological development. The 
characteristics of these technology clubs closely resemble those of the ‘innovation’, 
‘imitation’ and ‘stagnation’ groups identified by the recent model of Howitt and 
Mayer-Foulkes (2005). Our findings indicate the existence of two large knowledge 
gaps in the world economy: the first refers to the great distance that separates the 
group of followers from the technological frontier, particularly in terms of innovative 
capabilities; the second refers to the impressive gap that separates the marginalized 
from the followers clubs, in terms both of innovative capabilities and of 
infrastructures and human capital.  
The three clubs do not only differ in terms of their levels of technological 
development, but also with respect to the dynamics that they experienced over the 
1990s. By looking at the third column in table 3, we observe in fact that the club of 
followers on average decreased its distance from the advanced group for nearly all the 
indicators. This catching-up process was particularly rapid not only in terms of 
Internet users and telephony (reflecting the worldwide diffusion of ICTs), but also 
with respect to innovative capabilities (patents and scientific articles), which is 
precisely the aspect where the technology gap between the followers and the 
advanced clubs is more evident. The only exception to this general trend of 
convergence refers to the tertiary enrolment ratio, whose gap vis-à-vis the frontier 
increased by around 14%, due to the very rapid increase of tertiary education in most 
advanced countries in the period. 
However, when we turn the attention to the dynamics of the marginalized vis-
à-vis the followers club (see the sixth column of table 3) the picture is quite different. 
Here, convergence is rapid only in terms of Internet and telephony, and rather slow 
for all other indicators of technological infrastructures and education levels (i.e. 
electricity consumption, tertiary enrolment ratio, years of schooling and literacy rate). 
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On the other hand, the innovation gap between the marginalized and the followers 
clubs significantly increased (patents: +24.7%; scientific articles: +16%), indicating 
that the group of marginalized economies was not able to improve its innovative 
capabilities, while the other two groups have been very dynamic in this respect.  
This result is a reason for concern for the future of the world economy. Given 
that innovation is a key requirement to compete in the modern knowledge-based 
economy, the increasing polarization between rich and poor countries in terms of 
innovative capabilities may in fact lead to greater disparities in income and GDP per 
capita in the years ahead.14   
 
4. Econometric test of the technology clubs classification 
The results presented in the previous section, on the existence and the 
dynamics of these country clubs in the 1990s, have been obtained through a cluster 
analysis, and their validity depends therefore on the statistical precision of the latter. 
This section presents the results of an econometric test that aims at assessing the 
statistical precision of our club classification.  
This test is relevant for one major reason. In applied growth theory, this type 
of clustering exercise to identify different country groups has recently become very 
popular. In the last few years, several empirical studies have in fact proposed different 
classifications of countries into convergence clubs (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; 
Desdoigts, 1999; Hobjin and Franses, 2000; Johnson and Takeyama, 2001; 
Papageorgiou, 2002; Fiaschi and Lavezzi, 2003; Canova, 2004). However, the various 
exercises differ substantially in terms of (i) the variables used as discriminatory 
factors, (ii) the sample considered (time span and number of countries included), (iii) 
the clustering method employed, and consequently (iv) the results (i.e. the number 
and composition of country clubs). This leads to a couple of relevant questions. In 
general terms, how can we compare the statistical precision of different classification 
                                                 
14 The present paper does not aim at analysing in further detail the relationships between absorptive 
capacity, innovative capability and economic performance (Pianta, 1995; Castellacci, 2008). However, 
a brief look at the coefficients of correlation between our set of indicators and the GDP per capita in the 
period corroborates the above statement about the crucial importance of innovation. Both factors 
resulting from the principal component analysis are in fact positively correlated with the GDP per 
capita. However, the first factor, representing technological infrastructures and human skills, has a 
coefficient of correlation that is lower than the corresponding coefficient for the second factor, which 
represents instead innovative capabilities (in 1990: 0.51 for factor 1 and 0.65 for factor 2; in 2000: 0.57 
for factor 1 and 0.64 for factor 2). The relationship between different components of the process of 
technological accumulation and economic performance is indeed a relevant topic for further research.   
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exercises? And more specifically, is the precision of the club classification presented 
in this paper comparable to that of previous related exercises? Given the recent 
flourishing of applied studies in the convergence clubs literature, we believe it is 
necessary to find some way to measure and assess the statistical precision of different 
classifications, so as to be able to evaluate their explanatory/classificatory power and 
reflect upon the validity of the underlying theoretical interpretation.  
Hansen (2000) has recently proposed a method to deal with this problem.15 
The method computes confidence intervals of threshold parameters for the class of so-
called threshold regression econometric models. That is, given the results of a 
clustering exercise obtained through, say, a regression tree analysis (e.g. Durlauf and 
Johnson, 1995), Hansen’s method makes it possible to calculate the statistical 
precision of the resulting partition of the sample. However, the main problem with 
this state-of-the-art approach is that both the clustering method and the test for 
calculating the precision of the results are based on a cross-country growth regression 
model (typically a standard augmented Solow model). If the latter is misspecified, for 
instance by neglecting some relevant technology-related factors, then the thresholds 
that partition the sample would not necessarily be those that lead to the best partition 
of the sample space.16  
We propose here a different approach, which is not based on a cross-country 
growth regression model, and therefore does not impose any a priori structure on the 
data. The method is based on the estimation of a multinomial logit model, which 
estimates the strength of the association between the discriminatory factors (input 
variables) and the resulting country classification. This makes it possible to evaluate 
the statistical fit of different classification exercises, regardless of the sample, 
variables and method used to obtain them. In the remainder of this section, we employ 
this methodology to assess the statistical precision of our club classification. 
Appendix 2 then uses the same method to analyse the results of Durlauf and 
Johnson’s (1995) classification exercise, which is the best-known study in the 
convergence clubs literature. 
                                                 
15 See also the related work of Los (2006). 
16 For instance, Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004) have shown that, by simply changing the 
functional form of the Cobb-Douglas specification of the growth equation, the resulting classification 
of countries into convergence clubs differ substantially from the one originally proposed by Durlauf 
and Johnson (1995). 
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The test for our club classification is constructed as follows. The dependent 
variable is the categorical variable ‘technology clubs’, which takes value 2 for 
‘advanced’ countries, 1 for ‘followers’, and 0 for ‘marginalized’ economies. The 
purpose is to estimate the relationship between the choice of assigning country i to 
cluster j (where j = 0, 1, or 2) and a set of explanatory variables, which are those used 
as inputs in the cluster analysis. An OLS approach cannot be used in this case, as the 
explanatory variables are continuous, while the dependent is a categorical variable 
that takes only three values. The standard way to solve this problem is to estimate a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model (Scott Long, 1997; Peracchi, 2001). This is 
commonly expressed as: 
 
Pr ⎨Yi=j⎬ = exp(βjT Xi) / 1+∑kexp(βkT Xi)           for j = 2, 3, ..., J                              (1) 
Pr ⎨Yi=1⎬ = 1 / 1+∑kexp(βkT Xi)                         for j = 1                                           (2) 
 
where Xi is a vector of characteristics specific to country i, and βj is a vector of 
coefficients specific to cluster j.17 The country-specific characteristics used as 
explanatory variables in the model are those previously identified by the factor 
analysis, and then used as inputs in the cluster analysis, i.e. factor 1 (technological 
infrastructure and human skills) and factor 2 (creation and diffusion of codified 
knowledge).18 The results of the estimations are presented in tables 4a (for the year 
1990) and 4b (for the year 2000).19
The multinomial logit model is essentially a “linked set of binary logits” (Scott 
Long, 1997). In our case, the model simultaneously estimates two binary logits, i.e. a 
vector of coefficients βj for the followers and the marginalized groups of countries 
relative to the advanced cluster, which has been used as the reference category (the 
reason why the advanced cluster is not reported in a separate column like the other 
                                                 
17 Equations (1) and (2) are non-linear, and require an iterative solution. This is based on the method of 
maximum likelihood, whose maximum is typically found by Newton’s method in just a few iterations. 
18 We have additionally estimated a MNL model by using as explanatory variables the number of 
scientific articles and the literacy rate, because these are the two variables that have been used as inputs 
in the second specification of the cluster analysis (see section 3). The results of these additional 
estimations are largely consistent with those presented here, and are available on request. 
19 The models presented in tables 4a and 4b, as well as the models presented in table 5 below, do not 
include an intercept term. The reason is that if both explanatory variables take simultaneously value 0, 
say in the case of an extremely poor country, then the dependent variable will be 0 as well (i.e. the 
country belongs to the marginalized cluster).  
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two groups). Note that the choice of the baseline category does not affect the results in 
any way, so that any other cluster could have been chosen instead. 
Looking at the upper part of tables 4a and 4b, we notice that both factor 1 and 
factor 2 turn out to be significant in the model, as confirmed by the likelihood ratio 
test for each single regressor. This is a χ2-distributed statistic that compares the final 
model with a reduced model, omitting each single explanatory variable. However, the 
relative strength of the explanatory variables differs slightly in each cluster. In a MNL 
model each estimated coefficient measures the proportional change in the log of the 
odds-ratio of the dependent variable when the kth regressor changes by one unit. In 
other words, if the estimated coefficient βk is positive (negative), the likelihood of that 
response category will increase (decrease) by a factor of βk for any unit change of the 
kth regressor.  
The estimated coefficients for the models in both tables 4a and 4b confirm the 
basic characteristics of the clubs. Factor 2, a general measure of the creation and 
diffusion of codified knowledge, is negative and significant in both clusters, meaning 
that a greater ability to innovate and to imitate lowers the likelihood that a country is 
classified as followers or marginalized (i.e. it increases the probability that it is 
classified as advanced, which is the reference category).  
The magnitude of this estimated coefficient is much stronger for the followers 
than for the marginalized group, thus confirming that factor 2 is a more relevant 
variable to discriminate between rich and middle-income countries. Furthermore, 
factor 2 appears to have a stronger effect in 2000 than in 1990, thus suggesting that 
the creation and diffusion of codified knowledge is gradually becoming a more crucial 
discriminatory factor in the modern knowledge-based world economy. During the 
1990s, in fact, only those follower countries that have been rapidly able to enhance 
their capability to innovate and to imitate, such as Asian NICs, have been able to shift 
from the followers to the advanced club. 
When the attention is turned to the other explanatory variable, factor 1 (a 
broad measure of technological infrastructures and human skills) turns out to be 
positive and significant for the followers club in both 1990 (table 4a) and 2000 (table 
4b), meaning that greater levels of infrastructures and human capital increase the 
probability that a country is classified as follower rather than as advanced. The reason 
may be that the restricted group of advanced economies have already reached very 
 17
high levels of infrastructures and human skills, while follower countries, although 
quite close to the knowledge frontier, have still some scope for improvement in this 
respect. So, an increase in factor 1 is more relevant for the followers than for the 
advanced cluster, thus increasing the probability that a country is assigned to the 
former rather than to the latter group. 
The same does not hold for marginalized economies, however, because their 
distance from the technological frontier in terms of infrastructures and human skills is 
too wide. In this case, factor 1 turns out to be negative and significant in the 
estimations in both 1990 and 2000. This means that the higher the level of 
infrastructures and human skills, the lower is the likelihood that a country is classified 
as marginalized, and conversely the higher the probability that it is classified as 
advanced (the baseline category).20  
The lower part of tables 4a and 4b reports indexes of the overall model fitting, 
such as the Cox-Snell, the Nagelkerke and RLA pseudo R-squared.21 All three indexes 
show a very good overall fit of the model, thus confirming the precision of the results 
of the cluster analysis for both 1990 and 2000. This may be interpreted as saying that 
the explanatory variables are strongly associated with the dependent variable, i.e. the 
probability that country i is assigned to cluster j. This is a first way to evaluate the 
validity of the results of the cluster analysis: the higher the pseudo R-squared indexes, 
the stronger the relationships between explanatory and dependent variables, the more 
precise are the results of the cluster analysis.  
An additional way to measure the precision of the classificatory exercise 
presented in the previous section is to look at the correctly predicted percentage of 
cases, reported in the lower part of the tables. These provide a useful summary of the 
                                                 
20 It is worth observing that the explanatory variables that we have included in the econometric model 
are not intercorrelated, so that no multicollinearity problem arises in the estimations. The reason is that 
the explanatory variables in the MNL model are the principal components extracted by the factor 
analysis (see section 3), which are by construction orthogonal to each other. Thus, they represent two 
distinct (not overlapping) dimensions of countries’ technological capabilities. 
21 The Cox-Snell pseudo R-squared is an analogous to the interpretation of multiple R-squared based 
on the likelihood, but its maximum can be less than 1. The Nagelkerke pseudo R-squared is a 
modification of the former index so as to assure that it can vary between 0 and 1. Finally, the RLA index 
is a pseudo R-squared adjusted to take into account the number of explanatory variables in the model 
(similarly to the adjusted R-squared in OLS regressions). Note that all these indexes are pseudo R-
squareds: they aim at measuring the strength of association in the regression model, but cannot be 
interpreted as measuring the percentage of variance explained by the model, as is the case for the R-
squared in OLS regressions. 
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predictive ability of the multinomial logit model.22 The classification table shows that 
the taxonomy proposed in the previous section has on the whole a very high 
percentage of correctly predicted cases (around 99%).  
On the whole, the estimation of the multinomial logit model supports the 
validity of the results of the cluster analysis presented in the previous section, and 
thus the existence of three distinct technology clubs in the world economy in the 
1990s. The significance of the single estimated coefficients, the overall strength of 
association between dependent and explanatory variables, and the predictive ability of 
the model as measured by the classification table, all confirm that the cluster analysis 
has identified three groups of countries which significantly differ between themselves 
with respect to the chosen explanatory variables.  
 
< Tables 4a and 4b here > 
 
For benchmark purposes, it is interesting to use the same MNL methodology 
to assess the statistical precision of the best-known previous study in this field, 
namely Durlauf and Johnson’s (1995) work on convergence clubs. The results of this 
additional test are presented in Appendix 2. In a nutshell, these results indicate that 
the classificatory power of the new knowledge clubs partition proposed in this paper 
is comparable to that of Durlauf and Johnson’s well-known classification. We take 
this as an indication of the validity and the statistical precision of the results presented 
in section 3, on the existence and the dynamics of the three country clubs in the 
1990s. 
While providing encouraging evidence in support of our study, these 
econometric results also suggest a more general reflection. Economic and 
technological factors are both relevant aspects in the analysis of cross-country 
differences. The convergence clubs literature has traditionally focused on the former, 
while the Schumpeterian approach adopted in this paper emphasizes the latter. From 
somewhat different perspectives, both of them lead to comparable empirical results in 
                                                 
22 The classification table is obtained as follows. For each country i and cluster j, the model estimates 
Pr ⎨Yi=j⎬, i.e. the likelihood that country i is assigned to cluster j given the set of country-specific 
characteristics Xi. If this estimated probability is higher than a threshold value (0.5 by default), then 
country i is assigned to cluster j. This set of assignments is then compared to the values of the 
dependent variable, that is the actual cluster membership of our technology clubs. Finally, the predicted 
and the actual cluster membership are compared, and the percentage of correctly predicted cases for 
each cluster is computed.  
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terms of country grouping and classifications. The implication of this is not to argue 
that one approach is better than the other, but rather to point out that both of them can 
provide useful insights in the study of the development process. Economic growth is 
driven by the co-evolution of technological and economic factors, and mainstream 
growth theory should therefore re-consider the role of technological knowledge and 
its complex interactions with economic factors. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The paper has carried out an empirical investigation of cross-country 
differences in the ability to exploit the process of knowledge creation and 
dissemination in a large sample of developed and developing economies in the 1990s. 
The results show the existence of three knowledge clubs characterized by markedly 
different levels of technological development. The technological distance between the 
clubs is huge with respect to all the knowledge-related aspects considered in the 
study, namely innovative capability and the levels of technological infrastructures and 
human skills. Over the decade, these country groups have experienced different 
dynamics of technological change. The followers club has in fact come closer to the 
technological frontier, while the marginalized group has experienced an enlargement 
of its gap in terms of innovative capabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
What is the theoretical interpretation of these empirical results, and what are 
the implications? Four aspects deserve to be emphasized. First, from the point of view 
of the convergence clubs literature in applied growth theory, our findings support the 
hypothesis that the process of knowledge creation and dissemination, and countries’ 
different ability to take advantage of that, is a major factor determining the existence 
of convergence clubs. While all recent studies in this field have focused on a variety 
of economic factors that may generate country clubs, the Schumpeterian approach 
followed in this paper shows that countries differ, first and foremost, in terms of their 
ability to innovate and to imitate advanced technologies. The focus on knowledge 
creation and transfer capabilities leads to a precise three-club partition of the world 
economy, whose classificatory power is comparable to that of the well-known study 
by Durlauf and Johnson (1995). Future studies on the convergence clubs hypothesis, 
instead of exclusively focusing on standard economic factors, should therefore more 
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carefully consider the crucial role of knowledge and its complex interactions with the 
process of capital accumulation. 
Secondly, from the point of view of the innovation literature, our results bring 
new empirical evidence on the existence of three distinct groups of national systems 
of innovation. Admittedly, our indicators provide only a stylised measure of national 
systems, and do not take into due consideration the great variety of dimensions that 
characterize the creation and diffusion of new knowledge within each national 
economy.23 Nevertheless, the empirical result indicating that there are three markedly 
different clubs of national systems that follow quite distinct technological trajectories 
is an interesting stylised fact that needs to be explained by the innovation systems 
literature. Empirical studies of national systems have in fact so far almost exclusively 
focused on a restricted group of rich countries (our advanced club), and frequently 
neglected the developing world. The extension of the innovation systems literature to 
the study of innovative patterns and performance in less developed economies 
constitutes an important challenge for the field of innovation studies.  
Thirdly, it emerges quite clearly that the differences across countries are well 
captured by two factors, as indicated by the results of the factor and cluster analyses. 
We have labelled the first technological infrastructures and human skills, and the 
second creation and diffusion of codified knowledge. The results highlighted by the 
cluster analysis are entirely consistent with the existing literature on technological 
change and, in fact, seem to reconcile the views held by various approaches. When 
development economics is concerned with knowledge transfer, it naturally tends to 
stress the importance of absorptive capacity, which in turn requires infrastructures and 
human skills (Bell and Pavitt, 1997). The Schumpeterian tradition, on the contrary, is 
more likely to focus on innovative capabilities, reflected in the creation and diffusion 
of advanced codified knowledge. The empirical analysis has shown that, when we 
consider a very large sample of countries in the world economy, both factors are 
relevant to identify the position of nations, and that each of them has a specific menu.  
Fourthly, when we consider the dynamics experienced by the three clubs over 
the decade, our results cannot easily be interpreted to support one theoretical 
paradigm or another, and should thus be taken with caution. The time span considered 
in this paper, the 1990s, is in fact too short a period to provide any robust 
                                                 
23 For a valuable attempt to consider a greater number of elements that differentiate national systems of 
innovation see, for example, Godinho et al. (2006). 
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generalization on the convergence or divergence behaviour of different country 
groups. The results suggest however some interesting indications on the relative 
dynamics of the three clubs. The followers group has come closer to the technological 
frontier in terms of most of the technology variables, and this is certainly an 
encouraging indication for several middle-income countries that are trying to catch up 
with the industrialized world. By contrast, the large club of marginalized economies 
has experienced an increase in its gap in terms of innovative capability, and this is a 
reason of concern for less developed countries. In a Schumpeterian perspective, 
innovative capabilities constitute a key engine of growth, and an important source of 
cumulativeness in the dynamics of economic systems. A greater innovation gap today 
is likely to lead to a greater income gap tomorrow. The interaction between 
technological and economic factors would thus possibly drive the countries further 
and further apart, and such a Myrdalian cumulative causation could therefore lead to 
greater disparities in the years ahead.  
However, as previously said, the short time span considered in this paper does 
not make it possible to forecast with certainty such a gloomy picture for the 
developing world, and other elements suggest taking a more cautious and more 
optimistic point of view. Human capital and technological infrastructures are 
gradually improving, and ICT-related technologies are diffusing rapidly. Hopefully, 
what we are observing today could therefore be interpreted in terms of a Kuznets 
curve, where inequality is widening in this phase of rapid technological change but 
will later narrow when the international diffusion of advanced technologies will 
eventually benefit less developed countries as well. 
Two main policy implications can be drawn from our empirical results. The 
first concerns the uneven distribution of knowledge. Not only does each country have 
a specific combination of knowledge resources, but the various ingredients of 
knowledge creation and transfer capabilities appear as largely complementary rather 
than substitutes. The combination is strictly associated with the overall level of 
technological and, more broadly, economic and societal development. The 
combination of knowledge resources, and not just their level, does play an important 
role in positioning each national system of innovation. Any catching-up country 
should not just observe and try to imitate those who are at the top of the league, but 
rather trace its own itinerary, taking into account the existing knowledge capabilities 
and the possibility of successfully upgrading its position. Specifically, the building up 
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of the absorptive capacity of a nation through the improvement of its basic education 
levels and technological infrastructures should be a necessary prerequisite for the 
subsequent development of innovative capabilities and, hence, of a successful and 
sustainable economic performance. 
The second policy implication refers to the overall evolution of national 
systems. How many countries manage to upgrade their competencies and to ‘jump’ 
into the higher club? One significant fact is that no country slipped back into a lower 
group. By contrast, some countries managed to exit the group to join the one above: 
six countries moved up from the followers to the advanced and fourteen from the 
marginalized to the followers. Still, this upgrading has been possible for a limited 
number of economies only, while the majority of countries remained stuck in their 
own original club. There is therefore the danger that some of them can get into a 
technological underdevelopment trap – as predicted in Myrdal’s (1957) cumulative 
causation – in which the conditions of the past would hamper their strategies. This has 
become a well-established fact for developed economies (see, among others, Patel and 
Pavitt, 1994; Cantwell, 1991; Vertova, 1998, Andersen, 1998), but which appears to 
be even more relevant for developing countries. 
In particular, as pointed out above, the distance is increasing between the club 
of marginalized countries and that of followers in relation to the generation of 
autonomous scientific and technological capabilities. This points to a vicious 
international division of labour where a few countries generate knowledge for 
everybody. Even the reduction in literacy rates, the most basic technological 
capability, is much smaller than for other indicators such as Internet users and 
telephony. This suggests that policies for this club of countries should be re-thought, 
integrating national strategies, which often can rely on very limited resources, with 
the developed policies of the club of advanced countries and with the activities carried 
out by international organizations. 
The analysis carried out here is opening up new research questions. One of 
them is: how is each club associated with economic performance? Of course, we will 
assume that the performance of the various members is not homogeneous. But the 
detailed analysis for a variety of technological sources can possibly identify what is 
the most appropriate combination of resources to achieve a satisfactory performance. 
While it is doubtful that the economic policy recipe may be similar for countries that 
are at the top and at the bottom of the league, it is perhaps possible to single out the 
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good performance achieved by countries belonging to each category. This information 
could prove vital for the design of appropriate technology policies. 
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Appendix 1: The composition of the three technology clubs*  
 
Cluster 1: Advanced: 
Japan, US, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel. 
 
Cluster 2: Followers: 
Honk Kong (↑), South Korea (↑), Singapore (↑), Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Fiji, 
Austria (↑), Belgium (↑), France (↑), Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan 
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized: 
China (↑), Indonesia (↑), Vietnam (↑), Bangladesh, India, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua 
New Guinea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran (↑), Oman (↑), Yemen, Albania (↑), El 
Salvador (↑), Guyana (↑), Honduras (↑), Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Algeria (↑), 
Botswana (↑), Mauritius (↑), Tunisia (↑), Zimbabwe (↑), Benin, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
* The arrows indicate those countries shifting towards the cluster above between 1990 and 2000 
 
 
Appendix 2: A test of Durlauf and Johnson’s convergence clubs 
This Appendix presents the results of a multinomial logit test that seeks to 
analyse the classificatory precision of Durlauf and Johnson’s (1995) classification 
exercise, which is the best-known study in the convergence clubs literature. In their 
pioneering work, Durlauf and Johnson (D&J) identified four groups of countries by 
using two discriminatory factors, the GDP per capita and the literacy rate (both taken 
at their level in 1960) in a large sample of nearly 100 countries (ibid., p. 372). The 
methodology that they used to form the country groupings, the regression tree 
analysis, estimates a piecewise linear version of the augmented Solow model, thus 
identifying endogenously the number of clusters to partition the dataset (see ibid., p. 
381; Breiman et al., 1984).  
We have estimated a MNL model for their convergence clubs classification, 
whose results are presented in table 5. In this test, the dependent variable is the 
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categorical variable “D&J convergence clubs”, which takes value 3 for ‘high-output’, 
2 for ‘intermediate output/high-literacy rate’, 1 for ‘intermediate output/low literacy 
rate’, and 0 for ‘low output/low-literacy rate’ countries.24 The explanatory variables 
are the GDP per capita and the literacy rate, both taken at their level in 1960.25  
The results confirm the relevance of the D&J convergence clubs classification, 
and point out its statistical precision in a MNL setting. The estimated coefficients 
relative to the GDP per capita variable are negative and significant in all the groups, 
indicating that the higher the GDP per capita the lower the probability that a country 
is assigned to clusters 2, 3 or 4 instead of group 1 (which is the baseline category).  
A similar pattern holds for the literacy rate variable, which is also negatively 
related to the likelihood that a country is classified into clusters 3 and 4 instead of the 
more advanced cluster 1. This is not the case for group 2 though, where the estimated 
coefficient relative to the literacy rate variable turns out to be positive. The reason for 
the positive sign may be that the restricted group of advanced economies in cluster 1 
has already reached very high levels of the literacy rate, while the follower countries 
in cluster 2 have still some scope for improvement in this respect. So, an increase in 
this variable is more relevant for countries in cluster 2 than for those in cluster 1, thus 
increasing the probability that a country is assigned to the former rather than to the 
latter group. 
The lower part of table 5 reports the overall explanatory power of the MNL 
model.  The model performance is in general terms quite good, although the precision 
of D&J’s classification exercise turns out to be somewhat lower than that of the club 
classification presented in this paper. In fact, by comparing the lower part of tables 4a, 
4b and 5, we observe that the pseudo R-squared indexes for D&J model are slightly 
lower than the corresponding indexes for our club model.  
More importantly, the percentage of correctly predicted cases is significantly 
lower for the former than for the latter classification. In particular, the poorest country 
club in the D&J classification has a rather low classificatory power (around 21%), 
meaning that the countries included in this group could have very well been placed in 
other clubs as well. This result is in line with the recent finding of Hansen (2000), 
                                                 
24 For a list of the countries included in each group, see Durlauf and Johnson (1995, Table IV, p. 374). 
25  The data used for our MNL model estimation have been taken from Durlauf and Johnson (1995)’s 
‘Data Appendix’ (pp. 379-380). D&J’s data have been standardized before entering them in the MNL 
regressions, to be able to compare the results with those relating to our technology clubs classification 
presented in tables 4a and 4b, where the explanatory variables were also entered in standardized form.  
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who found the existence of very large confidence intervals for the threshold values of 
D&J piecewise linear regression model, and particularly for their poorest club. 
Hansen in fact concluded that “the confidence intervals for the threshold parameters 
are sufficiently large that there is considerable uncertainty regarding their values, 
hence concerning the proper division of countries into convergence classes as well” 
(Hansen, 2000: 589). 
 
< Table 5 here > 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: Results of the factor analysis for eight technological indicators, year 1990* 
 
 
 
      Principal components 
 
 Generalized least squares      Maximum likelihood  
 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion of 
codified 
knowledge 
 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion 
of codified 
knowledge 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion 
of codified 
knowledge 
Patents 
per capita 0.18 0.86 0.23 0.71 0.23 0,71 
Scientific 
 articles 0.35 0.86 0.29 0.96 0.29 0,96 
Internet 
penetration (‘94) 0.28 0.78 0.32 0.63 0.32 0,63 
Telephone 
penetration 0.86 0.34 0.86 0.34 0.86 0,34 
Electricity 
consumption 0.85 0.29 0.83 0.31 0.83 0,30 
Tertiary S&E 
enrolment 0.74 0.29 0.61 0.40 0.61 0,40 
Mean years  
of schooling 0.80 0.42 0.77 0.44 0.75 0,44 
Literacy 
rate 0.91 0.12 0.87 0.17 0.85 0,17 
% of variance 
explained 46.27 32.00 42.29 30.28 41.77 30,19 
Cumulative % 
explained 46.27 78.28 42.29 72.57 41.77 71,97 
 
χ2 test** 
 
-  26.43 (0.015)**  36.01 (0.001)**  
 
* Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
** Significance levels between brackets 
 
 
Source: Elaboration from Archibugi and Coco, 2004a. 
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Table 1b: Results of the factor analysis for eight technological indicators, year 2000* 
 
 
 
 
    Principal components 
 
 Generalized least squares s        Maximum likelihood  
 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion of 
codified 
knowledge 
 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion of 
codified 
knowledge 
Factor 1: 
Technological 
infrastructures 
and human 
skills 
Factor 2: 
Creation 
and 
diffusion of 
codified 
knowledge 
Patents 
per capita 0.17 0.89 0.22 0.79 0.22 0,78 
Scientific 
 articles 0.34 0.89 0.30 0.95 0.31 0,95 
Internet 
penetration 0.38 0.81 0.40 0.74 0.41 0,74 
Telephone 
penetration 0.86 0.34 0.86 0.35 0.87 0,34 
Electricity 
consumption 0.84 0.34 0.82 0.34 0.83 0,34 
Tertiary S&E 
enrolment 0.65 0.51 0.59 0.53 0.60 0,53 
Mean years  
of schooling 0.79 0.45 0.75 0.47 0.74 0,47 
Literacy 
rate 0.91 0.10 0.84 0.17 0.82 0,17 
% of variance 
explained 45.12 37.21 41.83 35.59 41.55 35,32 
Cumulative % 
explained 45.12 82.33 41.83 77.42 41.55 76,87 
 
χ2 test* 
 
-  21.04 (0.072)**  27.57 (0.010)**  
 
* Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
** Significance levels between brackets 
 
 
Source: as for table 1a. 
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the two principal components * 
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Factor 2, in 1990 (left) and 2000 (right) 
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* Epanechnikov kernel function. 
Halfwidth of kernel: Factor 1: 0.20; Factor 2: 0.25. 
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Table 2: Main characteristics of the three technology clubs* 
 
 
 
  Cluster 1: 
 
Advanced Cluster 2: Followers Cluster 3: Marginalized 
 
 
1990 
 
2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
 
Patents granted  
in USPTO** 
 
69.45 97.37 4.29 6.81 0.02 0.03 
 
Scientific articles** 
 
627.36 670.65 68.56 90.54 4.94 5.63 
 
Internet users  
(1994 & 2000)*** 
 
26.67 289.77 2.48 57.32 0.01 3.51 
 
Fixed and mobile 
telephones*** 
 
516.78 1055.92 163.07 404.72 13.36 47.14 
 
Electricity consumption 
(kWh per capita) 
 
9411.5 10450.9 2584.1 2989.4 265.8 318.5 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
10.87 17.31 6.68 9.33 1.28 2.06 
 
Mean years  
of schooling**** 
 
9.91 10.44 6.56 7.06 3.42 3.93 
 
Literacy rate**** 
 
98.66 98.80 91.29 93.86 58.01 67.57 
 
* The list of countries included in each cluster is reported in Appendix 1. 
** Per million people 
*** Per thousand people 
**** Population over 14 
 
 
Source: as for table 1a. 
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Table 3: The technology gap between the three clubs, and its change over the 1990s* 
 
  
Advanced 
vs. 
Followers 
  
Followers  
vs. 
Marginalized 
 
 
 
1990 
 
2000 % change 1990 2000 % change 
 
Patents  
 
16.18 14.29 -11.6% 190.3 237.4 +24.7% 
 
Scientific articles 
 
9.15 7.40 -19.0% 13.87 16.09 +16.0% 
 
Internet users 
(1994 & 2000) 
 
10.77 5.05 -53.0% 270.6 16.32 -94.0% 
 
Fixed and 
mobile 
telephones 
 
3.17 2.61 -17.7% 12.20 8.58 -29.6% 
 
Electricity 
consumption 
 
3.64 3.50 -4.0% 9.72 9.39 -3.4% 
 
Tertiary S&E  
enrolment ratio 
 
1.63 1.85 +13.8% 5.21 4.54 -12.9% 
 
Mean years  
of schooling 
 
1.51 1.48 -2.1% 1.92 1.79 -6.4% 
 
Literacy rate 
 
1.08 1.05 -2.6% 1.57 1.39 -11.7% 
 
* The first and second columns report the ratio between technological capabilities in the advanced and 
followers clusters in 1990 and 2000, and the third indicates the rate of change of the technology gap in 
the period. Similarly, the fourth and fifth columns report the ratio between technological capabilities in 
the followers and marginalized clusters in 1990 and 2000, and the sixth shows the rate of change of the 
technology gap over the 1990s. 
 
 
Source: as for table 1a. 
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Table 4a: Results of the MNL test for the ‘technology clubs’ classification, year 1990 
(Wald statistics between parentheses) 
 
Dependent variable “Technology clubs”: ⎨Y=j⎬,  
where j = 2 for ‘advanced’, j = 1 for ‘followers’, and j = 0 for ‘marginalized’ countries 
 
 
 
Cluster 2: 
Followers 
 
Cluster 3: 
Marginalized 
Likelihood 
ratio test 
 
Factor 1:  
Technological infrastructures  
and human skills 
 
24.47 
(133.44)*** 
-6.93 
(98.27)*** 185.35*** 
 
Factor 2:  
Creation and diffusion  
of codified knowledge 
 
-16.68 
(140.96)*** 
-1.50 
(16.03)*** 98.32*** 
 
Pseudo R2  
 
Cox and Snell: 
0.878 
Nagelkerke: 
0.988 
RLA: 
0.944 
 
Percentage of correctly  
predicted cases 
 
Cluster 2: 
98.5% 
Cluster 3: 
100% 
Overall: 
99.1% 
*** Significance at the 0.01 level 
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Table 4b: Results of the MNL test for the ‘technology clubs’ classification, year 2000 
(Wald statistics between parentheses) 
 
Dependent variable “Technology clubs”: ⎨Y=j⎬,  
where j = 2 for ‘advanced’, j = 1 for ‘followers’, and j = 0 for ‘marginalized’ countries 
 
 
 
Cluster 2: 
Followers 
 
Cluster 3: 
Marginalized 
Likelihood 
ratio test 
 
Factor 1:  
Technological infrastructures  
and human skills 
 
27.82 
(95.21)*** 
-3.94 
(101.44)*** 121.52*** 
 
Factor 2:  
Creation and diffusion  
of codified knowledge 
 
-51.12 
(108.60)*** 
-2.09 
(17.04)*** 158.54*** 
 
Pseudo R2  
 
Cox and Snell: 
0.881 
Nagelkerke: 
0.991 
RLA: 
0.954 
 
Percentage of correctly  
predicted cases 
 
Cluster 2: 
98.7% 
Cluster 3: 
100% 
Overall: 
99.2% 
*** Significance at the 0.01 level 
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Table 5: Results of the MNL test for Durlauf and Johnson’s ‘convergence clubs’, 
(Wald statistics between parentheses) 
 
Dependent variable “D&J convergence clubs”: ⎨Y=j⎬,  
where j = 3 for ‘high-output’, j = 2 for ‘intermediate output/high-literacy rate’, j = 1 
for ‘intermediate output/low literacy rate’, and j = 0 for ‘low output/low-literacy rate’ 
countries 
 
 
 
Cluster 2: 
Intermediate-
output/high-
literacy 
 
Cluster 3:  
Intermediate-
output/low-
literacy 
Cluster 4: 
Low-
output/low- 
literacy 
Likelihood 
ratio test 
 
Literacy rate 
 
3.16 
(7314.78)*** 
 
-7.63 
(4594.74)*** 
 
-5.75 
(2728.84)*** 
 
79.54*** 
 
GDP per capita  
 
 
-6.02 
(9876.00)*** 
 
 
-4.98 
(3516.48)*** 
 
 
-6.62 
(6892.79)*** 
 
 
44.98*** 
 
 
Pseudo R2  
 
Cox and Snell:  
0.839 
Nagelkerke: 
0.895 
RLA: 
0.648  
 
Percentage of correctly  
predicted cases 
 
Cluster 2: 
81.5% 
Cluster 3: 
88.2% 
Cluster 4: 
21.4% 
Overall: 
79.2% 
*** Significance at the 0.01 level 
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